South Korea is reviewing membership in NATO's Prioritized Ukraine Requirements List (PURL) — a mechanism that funds US-made weapons for Ukraine through pooled contributions from allied nations.1 The political rationale, offered without embarrassment by South Korea's own defence analysts, is that joining "could serve as leverage to expand South Korea's defense footprint among NATO members."1 The Canadian submarine project — a contract estimated at 60 trillion won — is specifically identified as "one of the most significant upcoming arms sales opportunities."1

This is not an alliance contribution. It is a sales strategy wearing alliance clothing.

And it is being advanced by a government that, as recently as February 2023, officially announced it would appeal a court ruling ordering $23,000 in compensation to a Vietnamese woman who was shot in the stomach at age eight by South Korean marines during a civilian massacre.2

The two facts belong in the same sentence. They are products of the same institutional structure.

I. The Leverage Admission

PURL was launched in July 2025 by the United States and NATO to accelerate weapons delivery to Ukraine. Member states pool financial contributions into a common package Washington uses to supply US-made arms. As of December 2025, contributing nations had pledged more than $4 billion. Ukraine needs approximately $15 billion through the program in 2026 alone. The mechanism has funded 75 percent of Patriot missile systems delivered to Ukraine.1

South Korea's Ministry of Foreign Affairs confirmed that NATO formally asked Seoul to join. Seoul's official position is that its approach to assisting Ukraine is "centered on humanitarian aid and other nonlethal military equipment."1

The strategic calculation, however, is transparent. South Korea lost the Polish submarine bid in November 2025 — a deal worth approximately 8 trillion won — to Sweden's Saab. It is now in direct competition with Germany for Canada's next-generation submarine program.1 In February 2026, President Lee Jae Myung held a call with NATO Secretary General Rutte at Rutte's request specifically to discuss expanding defense cooperation.1

Doo Jin-ho of the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses did not hedge: joining PURL, he said, would expand South Korea's "defense footprint among NATO members" — and he named the Canadian submarine contract as the immediate objective.1

A country that calculates its security contributions by their return on arms sales is not a values-based alliance partner. It is a vendor seeking market access through participation optics.

II. The Unacknowledged War

Before Seoul seeks to arm Ukraine through a NATO mechanism, it has unfinished business in Southeast Asia.

South Korea sent more than 320,000 military personnel to Vietnam — the largest foreign contingent fighting alongside US troops.2 On February 12, 1968, South Korean marines swept through the village of Phong Nhi in central Vietnam. According to US military documents and survivor testimony, more than 70 unarmed civilians were killed. They were rounded up and shot from close range. Survivors stated that the marines faced no meaningful resistance or aggression from the villagers.

Among the dead: the mother and two siblings of Nguyen Thi Thanh, who was eight years old at the time. Thanh herself was shot in the stomach. She spent almost a year in hospital recovering from the wound.2

On February 7, 2023, the Seoul Central District Court ordered the South Korean government to pay 30 million won ($23,000) to Nguyen Thi Thanh — the first time a South Korean court found the government responsible for mass killings of Vietnamese civilians during the war.2 The court rejected the government's claim that there was insufficient evidence of Korean culpability. It dismissed the argument that Vietnamese Communist fighters disguised in South Korean uniforms may have committed the massacre.

The ruling could open the way for similar suits from other survivors.

South Korean Defence Minister Lee Jong-Sup responded to the ruling before a parliamentary committee within ten days. His statement: "There were absolutely no massacres committed by our troops."3 The court decision, he said, "damaged the honour of South Korean soldiers." He announced the government would appeal.3

The Korea Times — South Korea's own English-language press — published an editorial calling for the government to admit to atrocities: "Killing unarmed civilians, including women and children, is a war crime that is unjustifiable under any circumstance. The executive branch must admit what it must admit — and apologize and compensate."4 The government chose to appeal instead.

No formal government apology has been issued. No structural accountability process has been opened.

A country cannot claim expanded authority within an alliance premised on international humanitarian law while officially denying a court-confirmed civilian massacre and contesting a $23,000 compensation to its survivor.

III. The Structural Denial

Korea's response to the Phong Nhi ruling is not an isolated political calculation. It is structurally consistent with Korea's institutional response to every documented human rights failure confronted by an external authority.

In 2025, Korea's National Human Rights Commission (NHRCK) appeared before the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination and submitted that racism does not exist in Korea.5 This submission contradicted the NHRCK's own survey data, in which 68 percent of immigrants said they believed racism existed.5 It was condemned by GongGam and the Korea Migrant Women's Rights Center as "a serious betrayal of Korea's human rights obligations."5 A counter-evidence report of 20 pages was submitted to the UN by civil society organizations.5

The pattern is identical across both cases:

  • An external authority documents wrongdoing (a court ruling / a UN review).
  • A Korean government body issues a categorical denial ("absolutely no massacres" / "no racism").
  • An implausible counter-narrative is offered (disguised Communist fighters / survey data that contradicts the body's own findings).
  • The government announces contestation (appeal / counter-report).

This is not issue-specific defensiveness. It is the standard operating procedure of Korean institutional governance when confronted with documented accountability. The mechanism does not distinguish between civilian massacres in 1968 and structural racism in 2025. It applies uniformly.

No country whose institutional governance architecture is built on denial-as-default can be a reliable signatory of international humanitarian law commitments. NATO's credibility as an alliance of liberal democracies depends on its members being held to those commitments — not insulated from them through accession procedures.

IV. The ESG Disqualification

Separately from the question of historical accountability, Korea's current commercial conduct crosses the ESG compliance thresholds applied by NATO-member defense ministries.

Labor exploitation at the point of production. At Hanwha Ocean's shipyard in Okpo — the facility at the center of Korea's Canadian submarine bid — 4,000 migrant subcontracted workers received bonuses equal to 46.8 percent of what Korean subcontracted workers received.6 This occurred in February 2026, the same month Hanwha was signing MOUs and Letters of Intent with Canadian institutions. The wage discrimination at Okpo is not an isolated incident — it reflects a systemic pattern: in August 2025, a Sri Lankan migrant worker at a brick factory in Naju was bound with plastic wrap and hoisted by a forklift by fellow workers, an incident that triggered national outrage across Korea as emblematic of the dehumanization of migrant industrial labor.7 Hanwha's response to the wage disparity was to publicly promise to equalize bonus ratios — and then renege on that commitment immediately after receiving public praise from President Lee.6

The sex trade economy. Korea's sex industry was estimated at 14 trillion won — approximately 1.6 percent of GDP — as recently as 2007, based on Korean Women's Development Institute data.8 The Ministry of Gender Equality estimated that 1 in 25 young Korean women was engaged in the sex industry.8 The documentary Save My Seoul (2017) documents that corporate slush funds are used to pay for prostitution or sexual entertainment within South Korea's chaebol corporate culture.9 This is not a peripheral practice — it is documented as ordinary expense accounting within large corporate entertainment budgets.9 Hanwha is a chaebol.

South Korean men are documented as the largest national source of demand for sex tourism in Southeast Asia and the Pacific Islands, including child sex tourism in Vietnam, the Philippines, Cambodia, and Thailand — the very countries whose Korean War veterans and descendants are being racially dehumanized in the same social media environment from which Hanwha's political support base emerges.8

Canadian legislative exposure. Canada's Fighting Against Forced Labour and Child Labour in Supply Chains Act (S.C. 2023, c. 9) entered force on January 1, 2024.10 It requires government entities and Canadian companies above specified thresholds to report annually on steps taken to prevent forced labour and child labour in their supply chains. A $60 billion defense procurement contract is not exempt from this obligation. Canadian procurement officials who award this contract without investigating Hanwha's documented migrant worker wage discrimination, the broader pattern of migrant labor abuse in Korea's industrial sector (including the nationally condemned Naju forklift incident), and the structural sex trade linkages in Korea's chaebol economy are not merely making an ethical error — they may be facilitating non-compliance with a Canadian statute.

V. The Brand That Travels With the Hardware

Korea's weapons renaming strategy is documented fact, not inference. The Hanwha Aerospace K239 Chunmoo multiple launch rocket system is sold to Poland as the Homar-K (Polish for lobster). The Hanwha Aerospace K9 self-propelled howitzer is sold to Norway as the K9 Vidar (named for a son of Odin).11 Hyundai Rotem's K2 battle tank becomes the K2PL in Poland. LIG Nex1's Shingung portable missile system is marketed to international buyers as Chiron, a figure from Greek mythology.11

Local names are chosen to embed Korean military hardware inside national heritage narratives. The K9 Vidar "aligns the system's image with Norwegian heritage."11

This localization severs the visible brand identity from the producing institution. It does not sever the supply chain. The K9 Vidar is manufactured at Hanwha Aerospace's facility in Changwon — a sister subsidiary, under the same Hanwha Group chaebol parent, as Hanwha Ocean's Okpo shipyard where 4,000 subcontracted migrant workers received bonuses equal to 46.8 percent of what Korean workers received.6 The broader migrant labor abuse context is well established: a Sri Lankan worker at a brick factory in Naju was bound with plastic wrap and hoisted by a forklift in August 2025 — an incident unrelated to Hanwha but nationally condemned as evidence of systemic migrant worker dehumanization.7 Whether Hanwha Aerospace's Changwon defense manufacturing workforce includes subcontracted migrant workers under comparable wage structures has not been investigated or disclosed by any NATO-member procurement authority — including Norway, Poland, or Canada. The corporate entertainment culture in which chaebol executive relationships are maintained through sex trade expenditures is the same culture from which K9 Vidar marketing teams operate. Naming a howitzer after an Odin myth does not change who built it or how it was financed.

Ethical liability travels with the hardware regardless of the name on the barrel.

Norway, as a NATO member and a recent Hanwha weapons buyer, has its own ESG procurement standards. The Norwegian Government Pension Fund Global (the Oil Fund) has established exclusion criteria including serious violations of human rights and severe environmental damage as grounds for divestment — criteria applicable in kind to defense procurement contexts. The Norwegian Defence Materiel Agency has not publicly disclosed whether it conducted an independent labor audit of Hanwha Aerospace's Changwon facility prior to procuring the K9 Vidar fleet — nor whether the migrant subcontracting structures documented at Hanwha Ocean's Okpo shipyard extend to Hanwha Aerospace's defense manufacturing operations.

VI. What the #SEAblings Are Missing

In January and February 2026, Korean netizens posted an image of an ape captioned "Angry Southeast Asian women" to a general audience of 83 million views.12 AI-generated images represented Indonesian, Malaysian, Thai, Vietnamese, and Filipino national symbols as animals.12 Jindo County Mayor Kim Hee-soo said publicly: "If all else fails, we should import young brides from Sri Lanka or Vietnam and send rural bachelors to get married."13

The target of this dehumanization — Southeast Asian women and nations — includes the descendants of Thailand's Korean War veterans, approximately 6,326 of whom deployed under the UN flag and earned the battlefield nickname "Little Tigers" from Korean commanders.14 It includes the descendants of the Philippines' PEFTOK (Philippine Expeditionary Forces to Korea), approximately 7,420 troops across multiple rotations — one of the largest non-Western UN contributions to the coalition that kept South Korea on the map.15

These nations sent their soldiers to die on Korean soil. South Korean netizens in 2026 used AI tools to portray the women of those nations as animals.

But the structural irony runs deeper than the blood-debt betrayal. The Vietnamese women being dehumanized through the #SEAblings crisis are the daughters and granddaughters of the same Vietnam in whose villages South Korean marines killed more than 70 civilians in 1968. Korea refuses to compensate the survivor. Korea refuses to acknowledge the massacre. Korea racially dehumanizes the descendants. And Korea asks to join NATO's Ukraine funding mechanism as an expansion of its defense market footprint.

These are not separate phenomena. They are the same hierarchy operating at different historical distances.

The #SEAblings movement — Southeast Asian solidarity against Korean racism — correctly identifies the contemporary wound. What it has not yet named is that the racism directed at Vietnam, Thailand, the Philippines, and Indonesia comes from a country whose government officially denies the systematic killing of Vietnamese civilians and whose cultural hierarchy treats these nations as available for dehumanization precisely because their geopolitical weight is insufficient to compel accountability.

Korea's politics of denial is not generational lag. It is structurally incentivized by the absence of any accountability mechanism: no national anti-discrimination law despite ratifying ICERD in 1978,5 no formal apology for Phong Nhi despite a court ruling, no ESG enforcement on chaebols despite documented corporate sex trade expenditure. Until those structures exist, the behavior will recur — in every new military partnership, in every new weapons deal, in every new MOU signed with Canadian colleges and Norwegian defense ministries.

VII. The Exploitation Economy the Hardware Travels With

The structural denial documented above does not operate only at the level of official government statements. It is reproduced inside the same corporate and institutional networks actively seeking defense partnerships with NATO-member governments — and it has documented cross-border reach.

Professor Pak Noja (Vladimir Tikhonov) of Oslo University has described what he calls the "Epstein Model": elite institutions captured by predatory interests, rendered incapable of protecting the public, operating through a "solidarity of predators."16 The UN Human Rights Council's February 2026 review of the Epstein files reached for the same framework: the documented crimes, committed "against a backdrop of supremacist beliefs, racism, corruption and extreme misogyny," may meet the legal threshold of crimes against humanity — a "global criminal enterprise" maintained through systematic institutional protection and "institutional gaslighting" of victims.17 Korea's documented institutional architecture satisfies that framework with forensic precision — because the structural logic is the same.

Gender Watchdog's forensic audit of Dongguk University — the institution most directly linked to Hanwha's claimed academic talent pipeline — found that 2 of 5 declared Canadian university partnerships were fabricated, and that a faculty member convicted of bid-rigging government subsidies was subsequently promoted twice and made Dean: institutional capture operating transparently, rewarded in public view.17 The same logic governs the exploitation pipeline upstream. In Korean university arts and culture programs — the talent feeder for both entertainment and engineering graduates — the Korean Women's Development Institute's 2020 national survey found that 61.5% of female students and 17.2% of male students experience sexual violence, overwhelmingly perpetrated by male-dominated faculty.17 The Korea Times reports that 66 percent of all sexual violence at Korean universities across disciplines is faculty-perpetrated. No NATO-member procurement authority has required an audit of these conditions as a prerequisite for contract award.

The grooming pipeline connecting universities to corporate hospitality networks is documented, not inferred. Industry accounts establish that entertainment organizations deliver young performers to wealthy men in exchange for sex, replicating clinical grooming stages: selection, access, luxury gifts, isolation, normalization, coercive dependence tied to grades, visas, casting, and career advancement.18 Save My Seoul (2017) documents corporate slush funds paying for prostitution and sexual entertainment as routine line items in chaebol business accounting.9 Estimates place Korea's sex trade at approximately 4% of GDP.8 Gender Watchdog's analysis of the BIFF x Chanel sponsorship ecosystem establishes how this exploitation economy intersects with prestige cultural events and defense-adjacent corporate networks — creating feedback loops where access to grooming pipelines and access to government contracts flow through the same elite infrastructure.19

These networks have documented North American reach. Two South Koreans have been federally indicted in the United States for operating a high-end brothel network in Washington, D.C., serving politicians, executives, and contractors with security clearances — the same population that evaluates Korean defense procurement bids.20 The UN Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women has formally documented Korean authorities' failure to identify and protect Filipina women trafficked into Korea through entertainment industry promises — establishing that the recruitment pipeline operates transnationally and that Korean state institutions have structurally failed to disrupt it.21

Korea's legal architecture ensures this exploitation achieves permanence. Human Rights Watch documented in 2023 that Korea's rape standard requires "violence or intimidation" sufficient to render the victim unable to resist — a threshold so narrow that courts treat compliance under fear as evidence against the victim — and that the Ministry of Justice rejected a consent-based standard within hours of its formal proposal.22 HRW's June 2025 report for the incoming Korean government further documented that defamation law is being weaponized to suppress truthful victim speech, and called explicitly on the government to ensure defamation statutes "are not abused for suppressing speech."23 The result is a juridical double bind: exploitation, silence, or criminal prosecution are the options the legal architecture provides to survivors. NATO-member governments purchasing hardware and seeking alliance cooperation from a state maintaining this legal architecture are not passive observers. They are jurisdictions with their own statutory obligations — and their silence so far has not been a neutral act.

VIII. Five Conditions Before NATO Access Is Legitimate

Korea's PURL consideration and its Canadian submarine bid are not inherently illegitimate aspirations. South Korea is a capable arms manufacturer. Its desire for security partnerships is understandable given North Korea's weapons cooperation with Russia.

But expanded NATO access — including PURL membership and the Canadian submarine contract — should be conditional on:

1. Formal acknowledgment of the Phong Nhi massacre and withdrawal of the government's appeal. The Seoul Central District Court's February 2023 ruling must stand, and Nguyen Thi Thanh must receive her $23,000 in compensation without further contestation. A structural process for addressing similar claims should be opened. This is the minimum required to demonstrate that Korea can be held accountable under international humanitarian law — the foundation of NATO's legal architecture.

2. Passage of Korea's long-delayed national anti-discrimination law. Korea ratified ICERD in 1978. It has no implementing legislation 47 years later. Without a legal framework for domestic accountability, the institutional denial architecture described above has no structural constraint. NATO members are democracies with anti-discrimination law. This is a threshold qualification, not a progressive aspiration.

3. Independent ESG audit of Hanwha's defense manufacturing supply chain. Any procurement contract awarded to Hanwha by a NATO-member government must be preceded by an independent audit of labor conditions at both Hanwha Ocean's Okpo shipyard and Hanwha Aerospace's Changwon defense manufacturing facility — including the use of subcontracted migrant workers, wage parity, and working conditions at both sites. It must also include an investigation of corporate entertainment practices as documented in Save My Seoul, and a formal compliance assessment against the Canadian Fighting Against Forced Labour and Child Labour in Supply Chains Act and equivalent Norwegian and EU standards. This audit should be a condition of contract award, not an afterthought.

4. Mandatory disclosure and independent audit of defense contractor corporate entertainment, hospitality, and talent-broker expenditures. Hanwha is a chaebol operating inside an economy where corporate slush funds paying for prostitution and sexual entertainment are documented as ordinary business accounting within large-firm corporate culture.919 Two South Korean nationals have been federally indicted in a Washington, D.C. brothel network that served cleared defense contractors.20 The UN CEDAW Committee has documented Korean state failure to protect women trafficked into Korea through entertainment industry recruitment pipelines.21 Canada's Fighting Against Forced Labour and Child Labour in Supply Chains Act (S.C. 2023, c. 9) applies to Hanwha's Canadian procurement operations.10 Any government entering a long-term defense partnership with a Korean chaebol must require, prior to contract award: transparent disclosure of corporate entertainment and hospitality expenditure categories; zero-tolerance policies covering third-party broker and talent-access networks; and independent audit certification that no procurement-related hospitality involves trafficking, sexual coercion, or grooming-linked access brokerage. The Epstein network operated for decades under exactly this kind of unaudited institutional normalization.17 NATO-member procurement authorities must not reproduce those conditions.

5. Consent-standard rape law reform and prohibition on criminal defamation weaponization against survivors. NATO's architecture rests on shared rule-of-law commitments. South Korea's rape law requires victims to demonstrate physical inability to resist — not merely the absence of consent — and the Ministry of Justice rejected a consent-based standard within hours of formal proposal.22 Criminal defamation law permits prosecution of truthful statements unless the speaker can prove "public interest" — a standard systematically deployed against survivors and journalists who expose the exploitation networks described in this document.23 These are not internal affairs isolated from the defense partnership question. They are the legal infrastructure through which the exploitation economy achieves permanence. A country that criminalizes truthful survivor speech and legally immunizes grooming-coerced sexual access does not share the foundational rule-of-law values NATO claims to defend. Consent-standard rape law reform and legislative prohibition on the use of criminal defamation to suppress survivor testimony are threshold requirements for expanded alliance access — not aspirational requests.

Until these conditions are met, PURL membership for South Korea is premature — and the Canadian submarine contract is a $60 billion liability, not an opportunity.

  1. The Korea Times, "Korea mulls joining NATO initiative to fund weapons for Ukraine" (Feb 20, 2026). https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/foreignaffairs/20260220/korea-mulls-joining-nato-initiative-to-fund-weapons-for-ukraine ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8

  2. Al Jazeera, "South Korean defence minister denies Vietnam War massacres" (Feb 17, 2023). https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/2/17/south-korean-defence-minister-denies-vietnam-war-massacres ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4

  3. Al Jazeera (ibid.) — Direct quotes from Defence Minister Lee Jong-Sup before the parliamentary committee. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/2/17/south-korean-defence-minister-denies-vietnam-war-massacres ↩ ↩2

  4. The Korea Times editorial (February 2023), as cited in Al Jazeera. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/2/17/south-korean-defence-minister-denies-vietnam-war-massacres ↩

  5. The Herald Insight, "Civic groups condemn racial discrimination as Korea faces criticism for xenophobia" by Jeongmin Kim (Nov 3, 2025). https://heraldinsight.co.kr/news/articleView.html?idxno=5837 ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5

  6. The Korea Times, "Hanwha Ocean's conflict with subcontracted workers undermines Lee's praise" (Feb 20, 2026). https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/business/companies/20260220/hanwha-oceans-conflict-with-subcontracted-workers-undermines-lees-praise ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  7. Business & Human Rights Resource Centre, "S. Korea: Migrant worker bound and lifted by forklift sparks national outcry" (Aug 2025). https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/latest-news/s-korea-migrant-worker-bound-and-lifted-by-forklift-sparks-national-outcry-and-government-response/ ↩ ↩2

  8. Wikipedia, "Prostitution in South Korea" (accessed Feb 2026). https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prostitution_in_South_Korea ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4

  9. Save My Seoul (Documentary, 2017). https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GF9ZoVWhBxY ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4

  10. Parliament of Canada, Fighting Against Forced Labour and Child Labour in Supply Chains Act (S.C. 2023, c. 9), in force January 1, 2024. https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/F-10.6/ ↩ ↩2

  11. The Korea Times, "From lobster to Norse god: How Korean weapons get new names abroad" (Feb 17, 2026). https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/southkorea/defense/20260217/from-lobster-to-norse-god-how-korean-weapons-get-new-names-abroad ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  12. The Rakyat Post (Malaysia), "SEA Versus South Korea: A K-Pop Fan War Nobody Asked For" (Feb 12, 2026). https://www.therakyatpost.com/news/malaysia/2026/02/12/sea-versus-south-korea-a-k-pop-fan-war-nobody-asked-for/ ↩ ↩2

  13. Chosun Ilbo (English), "Korean, Southeast Asian Netizens Trade Insults Over K-pop, Culture" (Feb 20, 2026). https://www.chosun.com/english/national-en/2026/02/20/FZT3SF3OCNFUPHZGCLIVXDQZCM/ ↩

  14. Wikipedia, "Thailand in the Korean War". https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thailand_in_the_Korean_War ↩

  15. Wikipedia, "Philippines in the Korean War". https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philippines_in_the_Korean_War ↩

  16. Gender Watchdog Blog, "Institutional Capture: How the 'Epstein Model' Explains Korean University Fraud" (Feb 13, 2026). https://blog.genderwatchdog.org/institutional-capture-pak-noja-epstein-model/ ↩

  17. Gender Watchdog Blog, "Blinded by White: How Korea's Racial Playbook Is Selling Canada a $60B 'Ghost Ship'" (Feb 24, 2026). https://blog.genderwatchdog.org/blinded-by-white-how-koreas-racial-playbook-is-selling-canada-a-60b-ghost-ship/ ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4

  18. SeoulBeats, "Sponsorships: Just Another Word for Prostitution?" (Feb 2016). https://seoulbeats.com/2016/02/sponsorships-just-another-word-for-prostitution/ ↩

  19. Gender Watchdog Blog, "BIFF x Chanel, Labor Dualism, and Korea's Exploitation Economy" (2025). https://blog.genderwatchdog.org/biff-x-chanel-labor-dualism-and-koreas-exploitation-economy-how-sponsorship-and-luxury-consumption-feed-on-racialized-sexual-violence/ ↩ ↩2

  20. Gender Watchdog Blog, "BIFF to Epstein: How Korea's Exploitation Economy Fueled the MAGA Far-Right Alliance" (Sep 2025). https://blog.genderwatchdog.org/biff-to-epstein-how-koreas-exploitation-economy-fueled-the-maga-far-right-alliance/ ↩ ↩2

  21. OHCHR / UN Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, "Korea failed to protect three Filipino women trafficking victims and ensure accountability" (Nov 2023). https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2023/11/korea-failed-protect-three-filipino-women-trafficking-victims-and-ensure ↩ ↩2

  22. Human Rights Watch, "South Korea Cancels Plans to Update Definition of Rape" (Feb 1, 2023). https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/02/01/south-korea-cancels-plans-update-definition-rape ↩ ↩2

  23. Human Rights Watch, "South Korea: Human Rights Issues for New Government" (June 24, 2025). https://www.hrw.org/ja/news/2025/06/24/south-korea-human-rights-issues-for-new-government ↩ ↩2