November 12, 2025

The Korea Times recently reported that South Korea's Justice Minister Jung Sung-ho announced the government may restrict entry for foreigners who make "hateful or derogatory comments" about the country from overseas.1 While framed as combating hate speech, this policy more closely resembles lèse-majesté laws—historical statutes designed to protect national image rather than prevent genuine incitement to violence.

I. False Equivalence: Conflating Conduct with Speech

The Korea Times article conflates genuinely disruptive criminal behavior with protected expression. It cites two cases:

  1. Johnny Somali (American streamer) - indicted for physically disruptive behavior in a convenience store
  2. Debo-chan (Korean YouTuber in Japan) - investigated for spreading false information about "dozens of mutilated bodies" in Korea

One involves physical disruption; the other involves speech. These require fundamentally different legal frameworks. Yet the policy treats both categories identically—and extends to any "derogatory comments" made abroad.

II. Vagueness: The Core Problem

Undefined Terms Create Arbitrary Enforcement

Critical terms lack legal definition:

  • "Hateful or derogatory comments" - no statutory definition provided
  • "Sweeping negative generalizations" - purely subjective interpretation
  • "Derogatory" - could encompass legitimate criticism

Consider this example: A student journalist at Chadwick International School recently published an article in Herald Insights documenting racism in South Korea using government data and expert testimony.2 The article noted:

"According to these organizations, 2.5 million immigrants now live in Korea… A 2020 Segye Ilbo survey of 207 foreign residents revealed that 7 out of 10 respondents said 'Koreans discriminate based on skin color.'"2

Under this new framework, would international outlets republishing this documented analysis face entry restrictions for "derogatory comments about Korea"? The policy provides no clear answer.

III. Lèse-Majesté Disguised as Hate Speech Law

Historical Context

Lèse-majesté (from Latin laesa māiestās, "hurt majesty") originated as treason against the Roman Emperor.3 Modern iterations criminalize offenses against the dignity of a head of state or nation—prioritizing institutional reputation over freedom of expression.

Contemporary examples include:

  • Thailand: Article 112 criminalizes defaming the monarchy, with sentences of 3-15 years. From January 2006 to May 2011, over 400 cases came to trial3
  • Cambodia: 2018 law punishes insulting the monarchy with 1-5 years imprisonment3
  • Poland: Article 135 criminalizes publicly insulting the president with up to 3 years imprisonment3

While many European democracies have abolished such laws (Belgium repealed its lèse-majesté statute in 2023; Sweden in 1948; Norway in 20153), authoritarian regimes continue expanding them—often framing restrictions as protecting national honor rather than individual dignity.

Korea's Proposal Follows This Pattern

The Korean policy:

  • Protects national image ("derogatory comments about Korea")
  • Targets overseas speech (extraterritorial scope)
  • Lacks clear definitions (enabling arbitrary enforcement)
  • Applies prospectively (banning future entry, not prosecuting specific crimes)

This mirrors lèse-majesté frameworks—not legitimate hate speech legislation.

IV. Legitimate Hate Speech Laws vs. Reputation Protection

Advanced Jurisdictions Define Hate Speech Narrowly

Germany's approach illustrates the distinction. Despite strict hate speech prohibitions, German law:

  • Defines Volksverhetzung (incitement of hatred) with specific criteria focused on incitement to violence4
  • Protects institutional criticism as core free speech
  • Prohibits Nazi symbols and Holocaust denial—but based on historical atrocities, not national reputation
  • Does not ban criticism of German government policies

Even Germany's controversial 2017 Network Enforcement Act (NetzDG), criticized for encouraging over-censorship, targets illegal content under existing law—not "derogatory" comments about the nation.4

Korea's proposal inverts this: it prioritizes national reputation over incitement standards, mirroring authoritarian approaches rather than democratic norms.

V. Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: A Global Overreach

The policy targets content created "from overseas"—claiming authority to:

  1. Monitor global social media for criticism of Korea
  2. Punish speech made outside Korean territory
  3. Restrict future entry based on protected speech in the creator's home country

This raises serious international law concerns. Extraterritorial jurisdiction typically applies to:

  • Universal crimes (genocide, war crimes, terrorism)
  • Conduct affecting domestic territory (cybercrime targeting local victims)
  • Citizens' actions abroad (child sexual abuse by nationals overseas)5

Protected speech criticizing a foreign government does not fall into these categories. France's Foreign Ministry condemned similar U.S. extraterritorial sanctions as "illegal under international law" in 2017.5

VI. Selective Enforcement: Who Gets Silenced?

Pattern of Asymmetric Accountability

The Korea Times article mentions prosecutions of foreign critics but is notably silent on:

  • Korean content creators spreading disinformation about foreigners
  • SNL Korea mocking Hanni (NewJeans member) after her harassment testimony6
  • Anti-Chinese/foreigner rallies in Seoul (documented July-Oct 2025)6

This selective focus mirrors broader systemic issues in Korean legal frameworks that protect institutions over individuals:

Korea's Domestic Speech Restrictions

The policy emerges within a legal environment that already restricts accountability:

  1. Criminal defamation law that punishes truthful statements7
  2. Non-consent-based rape law (rejected reform in 2023)8 enabling defamation countersuits against victims
  3. Institutional impunity for documented abuses

As Human Rights Watch noted regarding South Korea's rape law:

"Consent should be at the heart of any legal definition of rape. Article 297 of South Korea's penal code defines rape as intercourse by means of 'violence or intimidation'… insufficient for 'violence or intimidation' to be present, but rather it should render the victim unable to resist."8

This creates asymmetric accountability: foreign critics face travel bans while domestic victims face criminal prosecution for truthful testimony.

VII. Timing Reveals Defensive Posture

The policy announcement coincides with:

  • 216+ days of government silence on documented institutional sexual violence6
  • International universities reviewing Korean partnerships
  • Chinese student testimonies about sexual harassment going viral on Xiaohongshu (predicted drop in applications from China materialized with Vietnam taking top spot)6
  • Growing global scrutiny of systemic issues

This suggests the policy aims to deter international accountability—not combat genuine hate speech.

VIII. The NewJeans Connection: Systemic Silencing

The same legal framework enables:

  • Courts forcing NewJeans back to ADOR despite it being "like telling a bullying victim to return to the same school"6
  • SNL Korea mocking Hanni for harassment testimony amid anti-foreigner sentiment6
  • 80% of K-pop trainees suffering amenorrhea (medical harm)6 without accountability
  • Foreign critics facing entry restrictions for documenting these patterns

The through-line: institutions protected, individuals silenced.

IX. Conclusion: Reputation Management, Not Hate Speech Enforcement

The 11th-grade journalist's article in Herald Insights demonstrates the absurdity: citing government statistics about racism (68% of immigrants report discrimination; 70% of foreign residents say "Koreans discriminate based on skin color")2 could now constitute grounds for travel restrictions.

This is not hate speech law. This is modern lèse-majesté.

Advanced democracies are abolishing such protections (Belgium 2023, Netherlands 2020, Germany 20173), recognizing they undermine democratic discourse. Korea's proposal moves in the opposite direction—expanding state power to silence criticism under the guise of combating hate.

As the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression has emphasized, restrictions on expression must meet strict tests of necessity and proportionality. Protecting national reputation does not qualify.

References

For ongoing documentation of institutional patterns in Korean entertainment and education sectors, visit: https://genderwatchdog.org/

  1. Han, Jane. "Foreign content creators, be careful what you post about Korea." Korea Times, 12 November 2025. https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/southkorea/20251112/foreign-content-creators-be-careful-what-you-post-about-korea ↩

  2. Kim, Jeongmin. "Civic groups condemn racial discrimination as Korea faces criticism for xenophobia." Herald Insights, 21 March 2025. https://www.heraldinsight.co.kr/news/articleView.html?idxno=5837 ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  3. "Lèse-majesté." Wikipedia, accessed 12 November 2025. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/L%C3%A8se-majest%C3%A9 ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6

  4. "Censorship in Germany." Wikipedia, accessed 12 November 2025. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Censorship_in_Germany ↩ ↩2

  5. "Extraterritorial jurisdiction." Wikipedia, accessed 12 November 2025. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Extraterritorial_jurisdiction ↩ ↩2

  6. Gender Watchdog. Twitter thread on NewJeans, ADOR, and Korean institutional patterns, 29 October 2025. https://x.com/Gender_Watchdog/status/1983205399483609130 ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7

  7. Korea Economic Institute. "Problems with Korea's Defamation Law," 18 January 2019. https://keia.org/the-peninsula/problems-with-koreas-defamation-law/ ↩

  8. Bergsten, Susanné Seong-eun. "South Korea Cancels Plans to Update Definition of Rape: Nonconsensual Sex is Rape Under International Standards." Human Rights Watch, 1 February 2023. https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/02/01/south-korea-cancels-plans-update-definition-rape ↩ ↩2