Korea's New Entry Restrictions: When 'Hate Speech' Laws Become Modern Lèse-Majesté

November 12, 2025

The Korea Times recently reported that South Korea's Justice Minister Jung Sung-ho announced the government may restrict entry for foreigners who make "hateful or derogatory comments" about the country from overseas.¹ While framed as combating hate speech, this policy more closely resembles lèse-majesté laws—historical statutes designed to protect national image rather than prevent genuine incitement to violence.

I. False Equivalence: Conflating Conduct with Speech

The Korea Times article conflates genuinely disruptive criminal behavior with protected expression. It cites two cases:

Johnny Somali (American streamer) - indicted for physically disruptive behavior in a convenience store
Debo-chan (Korean YouTuber in Japan) - investigated for spreading false information about "dozens of mutilated bodies" in Korea

One involves physical disruption; the other involves speech. These require fundamentally different legal frameworks. Yet the policy treats both categories identically—and extends to any "derogatory comments" made abroad.

II. Vagueness: The Core Problem

Undefined Terms Create Arbitrary Enforcement

Critical terms lack legal definition:

"Hateful or derogatory comments" - no statutory definition provided
"Sweeping negative generalizations" - purely subjective interpretation
"Derogatory" - could encompass legitimate criticism

Consider this example: A student journalist at Chadwick International School recently published an article in Herald Insights documenting racism in South Korea using government data and expert testimony.² The article noted:

"According to these organizations, 2.5 million immigrants now live in Korea… A 2020 Segye Ilbo survey of 207 foreign residents revealed that 7 out of 10 respondents said 'Koreans discriminate based on skin color.'"²

Under this new framework, would international outlets republishing this documented analysis face entry restrictions for "derogatory comments about Korea"? The policy provides no clear answer.

III. Lèse-Majesté Disguised as Hate Speech Law

Historical Context

Lèse-majesté (from Latin laesa māiestās, "hurt majesty") originated as treason against the Roman Emperor.³ Modern iterations criminalize offenses against the dignity of a head of state or nation—prioritizing institutional reputation over freedom of expression.

Contemporary examples include:

Thailand: Article 112 criminalizes defaming the monarchy, with sentences of 3-15 years. From January 2006 to May 2011, over 400 cases came to trial³
Cambodia: 2018 law punishes insulting the monarchy with 1-5 years imprisonment³
Poland: Article 135 criminalizes publicly insulting the president with up to 3 years imprisonment³

While many European democracies have abolished such laws (Belgium repealed its lèse-majesté statute in 2023; Sweden in 1948; Norway in 2015³), authoritarian regimes continue expanding them—often framing restrictions as protecting national honor rather than individual dignity.

Korea's Proposal Follows This Pattern

The Korean policy:

Protects national image ("derogatory comments about Korea")
Targets overseas speech (extraterritorial scope)
Lacks clear definitions (enabling arbitrary enforcement)
Applies prospectively (banning future entry, not prosecuting specific crimes)

This mirrors lèse-majesté frameworks—not legitimate hate speech legislation.

IV. Legitimate Hate Speech Laws vs. Reputation Protection

Advanced Jurisdictions Define Hate Speech Narrowly

Germany's approach illustrates the distinction. Despite strict hate speech prohibitions, German law:

Defines Volksverhetzung (incitement of hatred) with specific criteria focused on incitement to violence⁴
Protects institutional criticism as core free speech
Prohibits Nazi symbols and Holocaust denial—but based on historical atrocities, not national reputation
Does not ban criticism of German government policies

Even Germany's controversial 2017 Network Enforcement Act (NetzDG), criticized for encouraging over-censorship, targets illegal content under existing law—not "derogatory" comments about the nation.⁴

Korea's proposal inverts this: it prioritizes national reputation over incitement standards, mirroring authoritarian approaches rather than democratic norms.

V. Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: A Global Overreach

The policy targets content created "from overseas"—claiming authority to:

Monitor global social media for criticism of Korea
Punish speech made outside Korean territory
Restrict future entry based on protected speech in the creator's home country

This raises serious international law concerns. Extraterritorial jurisdiction typically applies to:

Universal crimes (genocide, war crimes, terrorism)
Conduct affecting domestic territory (cybercrime targeting local victims)
Citizens' actions abroad (child sexual abuse by nationals overseas)⁵

Protected speech criticizing a foreign government does not fall into these categories. France's Foreign Ministry condemned similar U.S. extraterritorial sanctions as "illegal under international law" in 2017.⁵

VI. The Paradox: Simultaneous Expansion and Reform

President Lee's Contradictory Proposals

On November 11, 2025, President Lee Jae Myung announced two simultaneous reforms that appear contradictory on their face:⁶

Expand criminal penalties for hate speech targeting domestic rallies and protests
Abolish criminal defamation for factual statements (making it civil-only)

Lee stated explicitly:

"If we do amend the Criminal Act, we should take the opportunity to review abolishing the crime of defamation by factual statement. If defamation does occur through factual statements, it should be a civil case. It shouldn't be a criminal offense."⁶

This creates profound tension: the government simultaneously proposes to criminalize certain speech (hate speech at rallies) while decriminalizing other speech (factual statements currently prosecutable as defamation).

Why This Reform Could Be Progressive—If Implemented Fairly

The defamation reform would benefit accountability advocates:

Currently, South Korea's criminal defamation law enables powerful perpetrators to threaten institutional critics and survivors with imprisonment for truthful testimony. If defamation becomes civil-only:

Advocates documenting institutional sexual violence (like corporate executives holding academic positions) couldn't be threatened with criminal prosecution—only civil damages
Survivors facing retaliation from powerful figures (entertainment corporations, academic institutions) would face reduced threat of imprisonment
International students reporting harassment by faculty or administrators would face lower barriers to speaking out

This is a significant human rights improvement.

Note: YouTuber Kwak Hyeol-su's November 2025 testimony about rape by a taxi driver occurred after the driver was already indicted in September 2025,⁷ meaning she faced minimal legal retaliation risk (taxi drivers typically lack resources for defamation suits). The reform would most benefit survivors facing retaliation from powerful perpetrators with legal resources—precisely the pattern this advocacy documents at Korean universities and entertainment companies.

The Critical Caveat: Selective Enforcement Risk

However, civic groups immediately identified the flaw. Park Dong-chan of the Third Voice Institute noted:

"There are movements to enact legislation that would ban hate speech, but I don't understand why legislators are pushing the band-aid of hate speech laws when the fundamental measure of an anti-discrimination law is already on the table."⁶

Activist Mong, co-chair of the Coalition for Anti-discrimination Legislation, emphasized:

"Before enacting legislation that specifically deals with hate speech, we need to lay the groundwork with an anti-discrimination law. Anti-hate speech laws won't do anything without an anti-discrimination law."⁶

Without foundational anti-discrimination law, hate speech legislation risks becoming another tool for selective enforcement—protecting institutions rather than vulnerable populations.

VII. Selective Enforcement: Who Gets Silenced?

Pattern of Asymmetric Accountability

The divergence between Justice Minister Jung's travel ban proposal (Korea Times, Nov 12)¹ and President Lee's defamation reform (Hankyoreh, Nov 12)⁶ reveals competing visions within Korean government:

Justice Ministry approach: Restrict entry for foreign "derogatory comments" Presidential approach: Decriminalize truthful defamation + criminalize domestic hate speech rallies

Yet neither addresses the core problem: lack of comprehensive anti-discrimination law.

The Korea Times article mentions prosecutions of foreign critics but is notably silent on:

Korean content creators spreading disinformation about foreigners
SNL Korea mocking Hanni (NewJeans member) after her harassment testimony⁸
Anti-Chinese/foreigner rallies in Seoul that prompted Lee's hate speech crackdown⁶

This selective focus mirrors broader systemic issues in Korean legal frameworks that protect institutions over individuals.

Institutional Corruption: The Prosecution Scandal

The pattern of selective enforcement extends beyond speech restrictions. On November 11-13, 2025, Korean mainstream media documented a stunning corruption scandal that reveals who Korean institutions protect:

Justice Minister Jung Sung-ho - the same official proposing travel bans for foreign critics - allegedly pressured prosecutors to waive appeal in a 781 billion won (approximately $590 million USD) corruption case linked to President Lee's associates.⁷

As the Korea Herald reported:

"Prosecutors have failed to show unyielding resolve to realize justice according to law… Only 47.3 billion won of the 781 billion won in criminal proceeds has been recovered."⁷

The Hankyoreh was more direct:

"Prosecutors…motivated not by jurisprudence but by politics all this time."⁹

The Korea Times noted the contradiction:

"While [Lee] has vowed to crack down on hate speech and discrimination… his administration's actions suggest a selective application of justice… When a leader champions causes that appear irrelevant to the nation's immediate crises, their rhetoric risks sounding detached from reality."¹⁰

The pattern is clear: Justice Minister Jung pressures prosecutors to protect powerful figures in a 781 billion won case while proposing entry bans for foreign critics documenting institutional failures. Korean institutions protect the powerful (Lee's associates facing corruption charges) while proposing restrictions on critics (foreign "derogatory comments," domestic hate speech rallies).

Korea's Current Speech Restrictions

The reforms emerge within a legal environment that already restricts accountability:

Criminal defamation law that punishes truthful statements¹¹ (Lee proposes abolishing this)
Non-consent-based rape law (rejected reform in 2023)¹² enabling defamation countersuits against victims
Institutional impunity for documented abuses
Proposed travel bans for foreign critics making "derogatory comments"¹

As Human Rights Watch noted regarding South Korea's rape law:

"Consent should be at the heart of any legal definition of rape. Article 297 of South Korea's penal code defines rape as intercourse by means of 'violence or intimidation'… insufficient for 'violence or intimidation' to be present, but rather it should render the victim unable to resist."¹²

This creates asymmetric accountability:

Foreign critics face travel bans for "derogatory comments"
Domestic hate speech rallies now face criminal penalties
But truthful defamation might be decriminalized
Yet institutional sexual violence remains unpunished
And powerful figures in 781 billion won corruption cases receive prosecutorial protection

VIII. Timing Reveals Defensive Posture

The competing policy announcements (Justice Ministry travel bans + Presidential hate speech/defamation reforms) emerged simultaneously on November 11-12, 2025, coinciding with:

216+ days of government silence on documented institutional sexual violence⁸
Prosecution corruption scandal involving 781 billion won case (Justice Minister Jung pressuring prosecutors to waive appeal)⁷⁹
International universities reviewing Korean partnerships
Chinese student testimonies about sexual harassment going viral on Xiaohongshu (predicted drop in applications from China materialized with Vietnam taking top spot)⁸
Growing global scrutiny of systemic issues
Sinophobic rallies in Seoul prompting Lee's September 9 crackdown orders⁶

The "Politics of Distraction"

The Korea Times explicitly identified this pattern:

"While [Lee] has vowed to crack down on hate speech and discrimination… his administration's actions suggest a selective application of justice… When a leader champions causes that appear irrelevant to the nation's immediate crises, their rhetoric risks sounding detached from reality."¹⁰

The Korea Herald echoed this concern:

"Prosecutors have failed to show unyielding resolve to realize justice according to law."⁷

The timeline reveals the pattern:

November 11: Prosecution corruption scandal breaks (Justice Minister pressured prosecutors on 781B won case)
November 11: Same Justice Minister announces travel ban proposal for foreign critics
November 12: President Lee announces hate speech criminalization + defamation reform
November 13: Korea Herald confirms prosecution's failure to recover 733.7 billion won in criminal proceeds

President Lee explicitly cited sinophobic rallies as motivation:

"That's not freedom of speech. That's just rabble-rousing," he said at the September Cabinet meeting, calling for aggressive responses to rallies that "fan hatred."⁶

Yet the Justice Ministry's travel ban proposal targets foreign critics abroad—not domestic hate speech rallies. And the prosecution scandal reveals institutional corruption while policy proposals focus on speech restrictions.

This is the classic authoritarian playbook: When corruption is exposed, announce policy reforms that deflect attention from institutional accountability to speech control.

IX. The NewJeans Connection: Systemic Silencing

The same legal framework enables:

Courts forcing NewJeans back to ADOR despite it being "like telling a bullying victim to return to the same school"⁸
SNL Korea mocking Hanni for harassment testimony amid anti-foreigner sentiment⁸
80% of K-pop trainees suffering amenorrhea (medical harm)⁸ without accountability
Foreign critics facing entry restrictions for documenting these patterns

The through-line: institutions protected, individuals silenced.

X. Conclusion: Competing Visions, Fundamental Gaps

Korea now faces three simultaneous, contradictory speech policy proposals:

Justice Ministry: Travel bans for foreigners making "derogatory comments" abroad¹
President Lee: Criminal penalties for domestic hate speech rallies⁶
President Lee: Abolish criminal defamation for truthful statements⁶

The Progressive Reform (Defamation Decriminalization)

Lee's proposal to decriminalize defamation based on factual statements represents genuine human rights progress—aligning with international standards that protect accountability journalism and survivor testimony. This would benefit:

Sexual violence survivors facing retaliation from powerful perpetrators
Institutional accountability advocates documenting predatory appointments
International students reporting harassment by faculty or administrators

This reform deserves support.

The Authoritarian Overreach (Travel Bans)

Yet the Justice Ministry's travel ban proposal remains modern lèse-majesté—targeting overseas criticism with undefined "derogatory comments" standards. The 11th-grade journalist's article in Herald Insights demonstrates the absurdity: citing government statistics about racism (68% of immigrants report discrimination; 70% of foreign residents say "Koreans discriminate based on skin color")² could constitute grounds for entry restrictions.

The Missing Foundation (Anti-Discrimination Law)

Korean civic groups identified the core problem: without comprehensive anti-discrimination law, selective enforcement risks remain. As activists emphasized, hate speech laws become "band-aids" when foundational protections don't exist.⁶

This creates dangerous possibilities:

Truthful defamation decriminalized (good)
But travel bans silence foreign critics (bad)
Domestic hate speech criminalized (good if fairly enforced)
But no anti-discrimination law prevents selective targeting (bad)

The Pattern Persists

Advanced democracies are abolishing lèse-majesté protections (Belgium 2023, Netherlands 2020, Germany 2017³), recognizing they undermine democratic discourse. Korea proposes expanding state power to silence overseas criticism—while simultaneously taking progressive steps on domestic speech reform.

The contradiction reveals the fundamental issue: institutional reputation prioritized over individual rights.

As the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression has emphasized, restrictions on expression must meet strict tests of necessity and proportionality. Protecting national reputation from foreign "derogatory comments" does not qualify—regardless of how progressive domestic reforms may be.

References

For ongoing documentation of institutional patterns in Korean entertainment and education sectors, visit: https://genderwatchdog.org/

Han, Jane. "Foreign content creators, be careful what you post about Korea." Korea Times, 12 November 2025. https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/southkorea/20251112/foreign-content-creators-be-careful-what-you-post-about-korea ↩ ↩² ↩³ ↩⁴
Kim, Jeongmin. "Civic groups condemn racial discrimination as Korea faces criticism for xenophobia." Herald Insights, 21 March 2025. https://www.heraldinsight.co.kr/news/articleView.html?idxno=5837 ↩ ↩² ↩³
"Lèse-majesté." Wikipedia, accessed 12 November 2025. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/L%C3%A8se-majest%C3%A9 ↩ ↩² ↩³ ↩⁴ ↩⁵ ↩⁶
"Censorship in Germany." Wikipedia, accessed 12 November 2025. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Censorship_in_Germany ↩ ↩²
"Extraterritorial jurisdiction." Wikipedia, accessed 12 November 2025. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Extraterritorial_jurisdiction ↩ ↩²
Shin, Hyeong-cheol. "Lee orders crackdown on hate speech, including legal framework for punishment." The Hankyoreh, 12 November 2025. President Lee Jae Myung announced simultaneous reforms: criminalizing hate speech at domestic rallies while proposing to abolish criminal defamation for factual statements. Civic groups note these reforms lack foundational anti-discrimination law. https://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_national/1228847.html ↩ ↩² ↩³ ↩⁴ ↩⁵ ↩⁶ ↩⁷ ↩⁸ ↩⁹ ↩¹⁰ ↩¹¹
Korea Herald Editorial. "Prosecutors renounce legitimate power vested by people." Korea Herald, 13 November 2025. Editorial on prosecution waiving appeal in 781 billion won Daejang-dong corruption case despite Justice Minister Jung Sung-ho allegedly pressuring acting Prosecutor General Noh Man-seok. Only 47.3 billion won of 781 billion won in criminal proceeds recovered. Editorial states prosecutors "have failed to show unyielding resolve to realize justice according to law." ↩ ↩² ↩³ ↩⁴ ↩⁵
Gender Watchdog. Twitter thread on NewJeans, ADOR, and Korean institutional patterns, 29 October 2025. https://x.com/Gender_Watchdog/status/1983205399483609130 ↩ ↩² ↩³ ↩⁴ ↩⁵ ↩⁶
Hankyoreh Editorial. "Prosecutors' selective outrage over Daejang-dong case lays bare their bias." The Hankyoreh, 11 November 2025. Editorial on prosecution refusing to appeal despite massive scope (781 billion won case). Notes directors of prosecution's local branches demanding explanation, rank-and-file prosecutors pushing for acting Prosecutor General resignation. Editorial concludes prosecutors "motivated not by jurisprudence but by politics all this time." ↩ ↩²
Korea Times Editorial. "Lee's anti-hate vow has no substance." Korea Times, 12 November 2025. Editorial criticizing President Lee's "selective application of justice" and noting "politics of distraction." Compares anti-China rallies (ethnic targeting) to anti-Trump protests (political criticism). Commenter Foolslive correctly distinguishes racist ethnic targeting from policy criticism. Editorial states: "When a leader champions causes that appear irrelevant to the nation's immediate crises, their rhetoric risks sounding detached from reality." ↩ ↩²
Korea Economic Institute. "Problems with Korea's Defamation Law," 18 January 2019. https://keia.org/the-peninsula/problems-with-koreas-defamation-law/ ↩
Bergsten, Susanné Seong-eun. "South Korea Cancels Plans to Update Definition of Rape: Nonconsensual Sex is Rape Under International Standards." Human Rights Watch, 1 February 2023. https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/02/01/south-korea-cancels-plans-update-definition-rape ↩ ↩²